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U.S. TERM LIMITS, INC. v. THORNTON:
STATE-IMPOSED TERM LIMITS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, BUT WHAT
ELSE DID THE COURT SAY?
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent opinion poll conducted in 1995 found that 73 percent of
Americans supported term limits for members of Congress.' An ear-
lier poll conducted in 1991 showed that 75 percent of Americans fa-
vored term limits.2 Further, the 1991 poll showed this broad support
for term limits was not confined to a particular demographic group.3
Such nationwide approval of term limits has been the impetus for the
proposal and passage of term limit measures.4 Although there are
proposals at the federal level,5 the United States Congress has not yet
been able to pass a proposal for a constitutional amendment to limit
its members' terms.6
Because Congress has not passed an amendment to the Constitu-
tion to limit its terms, the states have attempted to effectuate term
limits on their congressional delegations through state constitutional
amendments7 or state statutes.8 These state-imposed term limits have
1. Robert D. Novak, Term Limits: The Will of the People?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE,
Aug. 31, 1995, at Opinion 1.
2. John H. Fund, Liberals for Term Limits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1991, at A18.
3. The poll indicated that 71 percent of blacks and 71 percent of Democrats approved of
term limits. Id. Also, 77 percent of those earning less than $20,000 per year favored term limits.
Id. Fimally, the poll showed more women supported term limits than men. Id.
4. See Thomas Galvin, Limits Score a Perfect 14-for-14, But Court Challenges Loom, 50
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3593 (1992).
5. A term limits measure was part of the House Republicans' "Contract With America."
Jackie Calmes, Even With New GOP Majorities in Both Houses, Term Limits Face Likely Doom
in Next Congress, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 1994, at A20.
6. A proposed constitutional amendment to add term limits to Congress was defeated by
the House of Representatives. Phil Kuntz, Congress Shows No Inclination Toward Reform,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1995, at A6.
7. See e.g., ARxz. CONST. art. V, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 10;
Mo. CONsT. art. III, § 45(a); MoNT. CONST. art. IV, § 8; OMIO CONST. art. V, § 8; OKLA. CONSr.
art. II, § 12A; OR. CONST. art. II, § 20; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 32.
8. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8700 (West Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-01-13
(Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.68.015 to .016 (West Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. § 22-
5-104 (Supp. 1995).
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prompted a substantial amount of scholarly commentary. Some schol-
ars have argued that state-imposed term limits are unconstitutional,9
while others have argued that they are constitutionally permissible. 10
Similarly, many student written works have examined the same issue
and argued that state-imposed term limits are either constitutional"
or unconstitutional.' 2
State-imposed term limits have generally taken two forms.' 3 One
form, "pure term limits," flatly declares that an individual may not
serve more than a specified number of terms as a United States Rep-
resentative or Senator from any one state.' 4 The other form, "ballot-
access term limits," prohibits an individual from appearing on the bal-
lot after serving a specified number of terms in Congress as a Repre-
sentative or Senator, but does not prohibit the candidate from serving
if elected as a write-in candidate.' 5
State attempts to limit congressional terms were voided, and the
scholarly discussion became "academic," when the Supreme Court
9. See, eg., Erik H. Corwin, Limits on Legislative Terms: Legal and Policy Implications, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 569 (1991); Troy A. Eid & Jim Kolbe, The New Anti-Federalism: The Consti-
tutionality of State-Imposed Limits On Congressional Terms of Office, 69 DENV. U. L. REv. 1
(1992); Martin E. Latz, The Constitutionality of State-Passed Congressional Term Limits, 25 AK-
RON L. REV. 155 (1991); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Are Congressional Term Limits Constitutional?,
18 HAgv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 1 (1994).
10. See, eg., Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Democratic Process: Voter Standing to
Challenge Abuses of Incumbency, 49 OIno ST. L.J. 773 (1988); Neil Gorsuch & Michael Guz-
man, Will the Gentlemen Please Yield? A Defense of the Constitutionality of State-Imposed Term
Limitations, 20 HoFsTRA L. REV. 341 (1991); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State Constitu-
tional Limits on Federal Congressional Terms, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 97 (1991); Ronald D. Ro-
tunda, Rethinking Term Limits for Federal Legislators in Light of the Structure of the
Constitution, 73 OR. L. REv. 561 (1994); Stephen J. Safranek, Term Limitations: Do the Winds of
Change Blow Unconstitutional?, 26 CREIGroN L. REv. 321 (1993).
11. See, e.g., Robert C. DeCarli, Note, The Constitutionality of State-Enacted Term Limits
Under the Qualifications Clauses, 71 TEX. L. REv. 865 (1993); Kris W. Kobach, Note, Rethinking
Article V: Term Limits and the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971
(1994); Sean R. Sullivan, Comment, A Term Limit By Any Other Name?. The Constitutionality of
State-Enacted Ballot Access Restrictions on Incumbent Members of Congress, 56 U. Prrr. L. REv.
845 (1995); Dwayne A. Vance, Comment, State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits; What
Would the Framers of the Constitution Say?, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REv. 429.
12. See eg., Brendan Barnicle, Comment, Congressional Term Limits: Unconstitutional by
Initiative, 67 WAsH. L. REv. 415 (1992); Tiffanie Kovacevich, Comment, Constitutionality of
Term Limitations: Can States Limit the Terms of the Members of Congress?, 23 PAC. L.J. 1677
(1992); Joshua Levy, Note, Can They Throw the Bums Out? The Constitutionality of State-Im-
posed Congressional Term Limits, 80 GEo. L.J. 1913 (1992); Johnathan Mansfield, Note, A
Choice Approach to the Constitutionality of Term Limitation Laws, 78 CoNELL L. REv. 966
(1993).
13. Marcia Coyle, Court's Turn to Vote on Term Limits: They're Politically Hot, The High
Court Must Decide if They're Constitutional., NAT'L L.J., Nov. 28, 1994, at Al.
14. See id. This type has been referred to as "genuine, unadulterated, undiluted term lim-
its." Rotunda, supra note 10, at 570.
15. See Coyle, supra note 13. See also, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 73, § 3, held unconstitu-
tional in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
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granted certiorari16 and settled the question in U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton'7 (hereinafter "U.S. Term Limits"). This note examines
the Court's opinion on the issue of whether state-imposed term limits
are constitutionally permissible. The Court, in reaching its decision,
properly relied on its precedents and the Framers of the Constitution
historical materials on the exclusive nature of the qualifications'" for
United States Representatives and Senators. The Court held that
state-imposition of pure term limits violated the Constitution. Fur-
ther, the U.S. Term Limits Court did not make a distinction between
the two types of term limits, which was correct under Supreme Court
precedents. Therefore, ballot access term limits are also unconstitu-
tional. Thus, this note concludes that the judgment of the Supreme
Court was well-founded.
Part II of this note describes the factual and legal background of
the U.S. Term Limits case.' 9 Part III briefly summarizes the majority
and dissenting opinions in the case.2" Part IV describes the author's
analysis of the constitutionality of state-imposed term limits in this
case.2 Finally, Part V examines the implications of the Supreme
Court's opinion.22
16. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 114 S. Ct. 2703 (1994) (granting certiorari).
17. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) affg U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1994).
18. There are several qualifications for federal officials in the text of the Constitution. For
example, an individual who has engaged in insurrection after taking an oath to uphold the Con-
stitution cannot serve in Congress. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 3. The main focus of this note,
however, is the qualifications for service in Congress contained in Article I of the Constitution.
For the House of Representatives, the Constitution provides: "No person shall be a Representa-
tive who shall not have attained the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of
the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he
shall be chosen." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. Likewise, for the Senate, the Constitution pro-
vides: "No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained the Age of thirty Years, and
been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabit-
ant of that State for which he shall be chosen." U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. Thus, when this
note refers to the Qualifications Clauses, the reference is to section 2, clause 2 and section 3,
clause 3 of Article I.
19. See infra notes 23-45 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 46-69 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 70-142 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 143-223 and accompanying text.
1996]
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II. US TERM LIMITS V. THORNTON
A. Facts
On November 3, 1993, the voters of Arkansas approved Amend-
ment 73, an initiative petition to amend the Arkansas Constitution.24
The amendment placed term limits on state executiveszs and legisla-
tors 2 6 as well as the state's congressional delegation.2 7 On November
13, 1993, Bobbie Hill and the League of Women Voters of Arkansas
filed a complaint in an Arkansas state court seeking, among other
things, 28 declaratory relief that Section 3 of Amendment 73, the sec-
tion that imposed term limits on Arkansas' congressional delegation,
violated the United States Constitution.29 A congressman from Ar-
kansas, Ray Thornton, was one of the named defendants.30 Both Ar-
kansas State Attorney General Winston Bryant and the political
organization U.S. Term Limits, Inc. intervened.31 Congressman
Thornton, although a defendant, joined Hill in moving for summary
judgment that Amendment 73 was unconstitutional. 32 The trial court
granted summary judgment because it found that Section 3 violated
the United States Constitution.3
23. ARK. CONST. amend. 73.
24. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Ark. 1994), affd sub nom. U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995). Amendment 73 passed by a vote of
494,326 to 330,836. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 351.
25. ARK. CONsT. amend. 73, § 1.
26. ARK. CoNsr. amend. 73, § 2.
27. ARK. CONSr. amend. 73, § 3, held unconstitutional in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 115
S. Ct. 1842 (1995). Section 3 provided:
(a) Any person having been elected to three or more terms as a member of the United
States House of Representatives from Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate
and shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed on the ballot for election to the
United States House of Representatives from Arkansas.
(b) Any person having been elected to two or more terms as a member of the United
States Senate from Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate and shall not be eligi-
ble to have his/her name placed on the ballot for election to the United States Senate
from Arkansas.
Id.
28. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 352-53. Hill also sought a judgment declaring that the entire amend-
ment was void because it was nonseverable and that the Amendment did not meet the Arkansas
Constitution's requirement of an enacting clause. Id. Because these issues were not presented
to the Supreme Court, they will not be discussed in this note.
29. Id. at 352.
30. Id. at 353.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Specifically, the trial court found that "Amendment 73 is a restriction on the qualifi-
cations of persons seeking federal congressional offices and violates the U.S. Constitution." Id.
[Vol. 31:585
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U.S. Term Limits appealed the trial court's ruling to the Arkansas
Supreme Court.34 In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill,35 the Arkansas
Supreme Court discussed the historical background relating to term
limits and the Constitution, 36 but found "the history to be helpful but
inconclusive regarding the issue at hand. ' 37 However, the court deter-
mined that in light of the intentions of the Framers of the Constitu-
tion38 and the Supreme Court's ruling in Powell v. McCormack,
39
Section 3 of Amendment 73 was not permitted under the
Constitution.n°
B. The Issues Before the United States Supreme Court
After the decision in the Arkansas Supreme Court, both U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. and Arkansas Attorney General Bryant petitioned
for writs of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.4' The
Court granted both Petitioners' requests for hearings42 and consoli-
dated the cases.43
34. See id.
35. 872 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1994) affd sub nonz. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct.
1842 (1995).
36. There were clearly instances of the consideration of term limits during the revolutionary
period and the framing of the Constitution. A proposal for term limits, called "rotation," to be a
formal provision of the Constitution was introduced and debated at the Constitutional Conven-
tion. However, it was ultimately defeated. CHrRLEs WARREN, THE MAING OF TIM CONSTrTU-
TION 420-22 (1928). Also, term limits were a part of the Articles of a Confederation, limiting
delegates to a three year term. ARTcLEs OF THE CONFEDERATrION art. V, § 2, 1 Stat. 4,5 (1778).
37. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 355.
38. Id. at 355-56 (citing CHArins WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrt-rION (1928)
and THE FEDERAuSr No. 60 (Alexander Hamilton)).
39. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
40. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 357. The Hill court gave two dissenting opinions. In the first one,
Arkansas Supreme Court Justice Hays stated his understanding that the states possess the power
to add qualifications to their congressional delegation. Id. at 367 (Hays, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("I find the United States Constitution does not prohibit additional qualifica-
tions for senators and representatives."). In the second one, Special Chief Justice Cracraft would
have held that the Qualifications Clause issue was not implicated because Amendment 73 was
merely a ballot access restriction. Id. at 368 (Cracraft, S.C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) ("I do not view the provisions of Amendment 73 to the Arkansas Constitution as raising a
'qualifications' issue, but rather a ballot access issue to be measured by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution."). And, under that analysis, Special Chief Jus-
tice Cracraft would have held that section 3 of Amendment 73 passed constitutional standards.
Id. at 370 (Cracraft, S.C.J., dissenting) ("I would hold that Amendment 73 to the Arkansas
Constitution... is not constitutionally infirm in any respect....").
41. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1847 (1995).
42. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 114 S. Ct. 2703 (1994) (granting certiorari); Bryant
v. Hill, 114 S. Ct. 2703 (1994) (granting certiorari).
43. Id.
5
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The issues presented to the Supreme Court were "whether the
Constitution forbids States from adding to or altering the qualifica-
tions specifically enumerated in the Constitution" 44 and "if the Consti-
tution does so forbid, whether the fact that Amendment 73 is
formulated as a ballot access restriction rather than as an outright dis-
qualification is of constitutional significance. '4-
III. THEU S TERM LIMITS DECISION
In U.S. Term Limits, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the Arkansas Supreme Court by a five to four decision.46 In so doing,
the Court determined that state-imposed ballot access term limits on
members of Congress violated the Constitution.47 Thus, section 3 of
Arkansas Amendment 73 could not constitutionally impose any limits
on Arkansas' congressional delegation.
In reaching its decision, the Court, speaking through Justice Ste-
vens, took several analytical steps. First, the Court addressed the
question of whether the Constitution sets forth the exclusive qualifica-
tions for membership in Congress. 48 The petitioners argued that the
Court's decision in Powell v. McCormack49 could be narrowly inter-
preted as a decision on the powers of Congress, not the powers of
States.50 On this point, the Court did not distinguish or overturn its
prior decision in Powell. Rather, the Court followed Powell's holding
that the historical materials of the Framers showed their intent that
the Qualifications Clauses were to be exclusive.5'
Second, because the petitioners made a Tenth Amendment argu-
ment, the Court decided to determine whether the several states, in
this case Arkansas, had the power to add to or alter the qualifications
44. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1847 (1995).
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Id at 1845.
48. Id. at 1847-52.
49. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
50. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1851. The Court noted:
Petitioners argue somewhat half-heartedly that the narrow holding in Powell, which
involved the power of the House to exclude a member pursuant to Art. I, § 5, does not
control the more general question whether Congress has the power to add qualifica-
tions. Powell, however, is not susceptible to such a narrow reading. Our conclusion
that Congress may not alter or add to the qualifications in the Constitution was integral
to our analysis and outcome.
Id.
51. See id. at 1852 ("[W]e reaffirm that the qualifications for service in Congress set forth in
the text of the Constitution are 'fixed'....").
[Vol. 31:585
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given in the Constitution.52 On this point the Court first determined
that the states were without the power because it was not a reserved
power under the Tenth Amendment.53 In the majority's view the sev-
eral States do not possess powers which did not exist prior to the
framing of the Constitution. 54 The Court then gave an alternative ba-
sis for finding an absence of state power: the Constitution precluded
state power on the matter.55 Thus, the Court in U.S. Term Limits held
that the State of Arkansas did not have the power to add to or alter
the qualifications of its congressional delegation.56
Finally, the Court had to wrestle with the issue of whether or not
section 3 of Amendment 7357 was in fact a "qualification. ' 58 The peti-
tioners argued that section 3 was not a qualification since it did not
prohibit a congressional candidate from being elected; it only prohib-
ited a candidate who had already served three terms from appearing
on the ballot.59 The Court did not accept this argument and found
that such a distinction was not of constitutional significance.6 °
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which he was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia.6' In his
analysis, Justice Thomas went directly to the issue of whether the sev-
eral States have the power to prescribe qualifications for their con-
gressional delegations. 62 First, Justice Thomas determined, in dissent,
that the States retain any power not delegated to the Federal Govern-
ment in the Constitution.63 His interpretation was that the Qualifica-
tions Clauses6' did not limit the powers of the several States to add
52. See iL at 1852-66.
53. See id. at 1854 ("[T]he power to add qualifications is not part of the original powers of
sovereignty that the Tenth Amendment reserved to the States.").
54. See id ("[The Tenth Amendment] could only 'reserve' that which existed before.").
55. See id. at 1856 ("[T]he Qualifications Clauses were intended to preclude the States from
exercising any such power and to fix as exclusive the qualifications in the Constitution.").
56. See id at 1854.
57. ARK. CONsT. amend. 73, § 3, held unconstitutional in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
58. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1866-71.
59. See id. at 1866-67 ("Petitioners argue that, even if States may not add qualifications,
Amendment 73 is constitutional because it is not such a qualification . .
60. See id. at 1867-71.
61. See id. at 1875-1914 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1875-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
63. See id at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[W]here the Constitution is silent about the
exercise of a particular power-that is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly or
by necessary implication-the Federal Government lacks that power and the States enjoy it.").
64. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
1996]
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qualifications 65 and that the decision of Powell v. McCormack66 was
limited to the powers of Congress.67 Then, Justice Thomas stated his
understanding that there was nothing in the text of the Constitution
which precluded state power.68 In the final analysis, Justice Thomas
and the Justices who joined him would have reversed the judgment of
the Arkansas Supreme Court.69
IV. ANALYSIS
In deciding U.S. Term Limits, the Court's ultimate judgment was
supported by many authorities. The reaffirmation by the U.S. Term
Limits majority of the holding in Powell v. McCormack, ° that the
qualifications for congressional members were exclusively set forth in
the Constitution and could not be added to or altered in any manner
other that by amendment,7 ' seems to be correct. Additionally, the
Court's holding that section 3 of Amendment 7372 constitutes a "qual-
ification" under the Constitution was supported.
This note's analysis first illustrates that pure term limits imposed
by states violate the Constitution because the qualifications set forth
in the Constitution are exclusive. The analysis further demonstrates
that state-imposed ballot access term limits violate the Constitution
because they constitute qualifications.
A. The Exclusivity of the Constitutional Qualifications
As one scholar has correctly recognized, "[w]hether or not the
Qualifications Clauses are exclusive is not.., a question that can be
answered by parsing the language of the Constitution."73 The Court
in U.S. Term Limits brought together a number of authorities to sup-
port its conclusion that the qualifications for membership in Congress
65. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. CL at 1885 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[The Qualifications
Clauses] restrict state power only in that they prevent the States from abolishing all eligibility
requirements for membership in Congress.").
66. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
67. Se4 U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1889-90 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68. See id. at 1877-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
69. See id. at 1914 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
70. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
71. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1845 ("If the qualifications set forth in the text of the
Constitution are to be changed, that text must be amended.").
72. ARm CONST. amend. 73, § 3, held unconstitutional in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
73. Lowenstein, supra note 9, at 10.
[Vol. 31:585
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given by the Constitution are exclusive.74 An examination of histori-
cal authorities and prior Supreme Court decisions reveals that the
Court's holding was correct.
1. Historical Support
Among the authorities which support the exclusivity of the Quali-
fications Clauses are the discussions of qualifications for members of
the federal legislature in the Federalist Papers.' A passage written by
Alexander Hamilton sheds light on how the Framers believed the
Constitution contained the exclusive qualifications for membership in
the Congress.76 The Framers' fear that property qualifications could
be set by the legislature motivated the creation of the Qualifications
Clauses,77 and Hamilton's use of the phrase "defined and fixed in the
Constitution and... unalterable .... 7 8  Another paper written by
James Madison likewise demonstrates the Framers' intent that the
Qualifications Clauses be exclusive so that religious or national origin
requirements would not be placed upon members of Congress. 79
Charles Warren's account of the Constitutional Convention also
clearly shows the intent of the Framers that the qualifications for
members of Congress were exclusively set forth in the Constitution.80
During debate over whether Congress should have the power under
Article I, section 5 of the Constitution l to set additional qualifica-
tions, James Madison emphatically opposed giving Congress this
74. See U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1847-52, 1856-66.
75. THE FEDERAtiST No. 60 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 52 (James Madison).
76. Hamilton wrote:
The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended
but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be
elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national govern-
ment. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the
places, and the manner of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose
or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the
Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature.
THE FEDERAUiST No. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
77. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
78. THE FEDERAUaST No. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
79. Madison wrote:
The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly defined by State
constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been
very properly considered and regulated by the convention.... Under these reasonable
limitations, the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every
description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to
poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.
THm FEDERAUaSr No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
80. WA , supra note 36, at 412-26.
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
9
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power.' Subsequently, the Convention defeated proposals to give
Congress the power to set either general qualifications or only prop-
erty qualifications.83 These actions support the conclusion, shared by
Warren, that the Convention made age, citizenship and residency the
exclusive qualifications for membership in Congress. 84
Another historical writer who agreed that the Qualifications
Clauses were exclusive was Justice Joseph Story.8s He suggested that,
if the qualifications enumerated in the Constitution were not exclu-
sive, the States could dissolve the Congress by making all persons inel-
igible under their own qualifications.86 Also, Justice Story recognized
that if adding qualifications were permitted, then either the States or
Congress could vary those specified in the Constitution.87 Thus,
States would be able to circumvent the age, citizenship and residency
requirements of the Qualifications Clauses.8 8 Justice Story's observa-
tions, therefore, further support the exclusive nature of qualifications
for membership in the Congress.
2. Supreme Court Precedents
Although the historical materials of the Framers and Justice
Story's commentaries, standing alone, support the proposition that the
Qualifications Clauses are exclusive, the decision of the Supreme
Court in Powell v. McConnack89 seems to have authoritatively de-
cided the issue. The Court in Powell found that the qualifications for
membership in the United States Congress were exclusive under the
Constitution.90 In that case, Adam Clayton Powell was elected to
82. WARREN, supra note 36, at 420. Madison is quoted in Warren's text as saying:
[T]he qualifications of the elected were "fundamental articles in a Republican Govern-
ment and ought to be fixed by the Constitution." If the Legislature could regulate
them, "it can by degrees subvert the Constitution ... by limiting the number capable of
being elected.... Qualifications founded on artificial distinctions may be devised by
the stronger, in order to keep out partisans of a weaker faction."
Id.
83. Id. at 421.
84. Id. ("[A]s the Convention refused to grant to Congress power to establish qualifications
in general, the maxim expressio unius exclusio alterius would seem to apply.").
85. See 2 JosEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON T=E CONSTITUTION §§ 612-628 (1833), re-
printed in 2 TBE FotrwRs' CONsTrrTION 81-85 (Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
86. Id. at § 623 ("A state may, with the sole object of dissolving the Union, create qualifica-
tions so high, and so singular, that it shall become impracticable to elect any representative.").
87. Id. at § 624.
88. See id.
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serve in the United States House of Representatives from a congres-
sional district in New York.91 The House, however, did not allow
Powell to take his seat or oath because there were allegations of im-
propriety on his part.92 Subsequently, the House voted to exclude
Powell from his seat.93 Powell then filed an action for declaratory re-
lief that his exclusion from the House was unconstitutional. 94 The dis-
trict court dismissed the case,95 and the court of appeals affirmed,
ruling that the case was not "justiciable. ' 96
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the court of appeals'
judgment. The Powell Court examined whether the case was "justicia-
ble" or if it merely presented a "political question." 97 In doing so, the
Court determined that a decision of whether the case involved a polit-
ical question must turn on whether the House had the power to add to
the qualifications of its members beyond those enumerated in the
Constitution.98 If the House did have such power, there would be a
"textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue"9 9 to
the House.' 0° The decision rested on an evaluation of the various his-
torical materials to determine the intentions of the Framers.10 1
In Powell, the Court considered authorities other than the Feder-
alist Papers and Justice Story's commentaries.'0 2 First, English legisla-
tive and court precedents prior to the Constitutional Convention were
discussed. 103 The Court found the English precedent of the John
Wilkes case to be the most notable.'0 4 In that case, Wilkes was not
seated in the Parliament despite having been elected to it several
times.' 05 The resolution of the dispute came in 1782 when Wilkes was
finally seated.' 0 6 In the view of the Powell court, the Wilkes case
91. Id. at 489.
92. Id. at 490. Specifically, Powell, as chairman of the House Committee on Education and
Labor, was accused of making false statements on travel expenses and directing an illegal salary
to his wife. Id.
93. Id. at 493.
94. Id. at 494.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 512.
97. Id. at 516-49.
98. Id. at 520.
99. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
100. Powell, 395 U.S. at 521.
101. Id. at 522-48.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 527-531.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 527-28 (citing 16 Pan. Hist. Eng. 545 (1769)).
106. Id. at 528 (citing 22 Pan. Hist. Eng. 1411 (1782)).
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demonstrated the English interpretation of the fixed nature of qualifi-
cations for legislators.1°7
Secondly, the Court in Powell examined the experience of an
early Congress with regard to the qualifications of its members. 10 8
The Court cited the challenge to William McCreery's eligibility for
membership in Congress in 1807.109 In that year, the state of Mary-
land tried to impose additional residency qualifications on its Con-
gressional delegation. 110 The House of Representatives, however,
decided that McCreery should be seated because Maryland's imposi-
tion of qualifications was contrary to the Constitution."1 Such action
signaled the understanding that the United States House of Repre-
sentatives, in 1807, believed the Qualifications Clauses were exclusive.
Due to its proximity to the Constitution's ratification, the Powell
Court found the McCreery incident to be of significant precedential
value." 2 In conclusion, Chief Justice Warren found that the House
only had the power to expel members for not meeting "the qualifica-
tions expressly set forth in the Constitution. 1 1 3 Thus, Powell decided
what was apparent from the intentions of the Framers.
The Powell decision was reaffirmed in the Supreme Court deci-
sion of Nixon v. United States."4 In that case, the Court was again
faced with another determination of whether the case presented a
political question or was justiciable.11 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
speaking for the majority, found Powell to be controlling on the is-
sue.1 1 6 In explaining his reliance on Powell the Chief Justice noted
107. Chief Justice Warren wrote:
With the successful resolution of Wilkes' long and bitter struggle for the right of the
British electorate to be represented by men of their own choice, it is evident that, on
the eve of the Constitutional Convention, English precedent stood for the proposition
that "the law of the land had regulated the qualifications of members to serve in parlia-
ment" and those qualifications were "not occasional but fixed."
Id. at 528 (quoting 16 Parl. Hist. Eng. 589, 590 (1769)).
108. Id. at 541-47.
109. Id. at 542-43.
110. Id. at 542.
111. The language used by that early Congress was:
The Committee of Elections considered the qualifications of members to have been
unalterably determined by the Federal Convention, unless changed by an authority
equal to that which framed the Constitution at first; that neither the State nor the Fed-
eral Legislatures are vested with authority to add to those qualifications, so as to
change them.
Id. at 542-43 (quoting 17 Annals of Cong. 872 (1807)).
112. See id. at 547 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
113. Id. at 548.
114. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
115. Id. at 735.
116. See id. at 739-40.
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that, in Powell "[w]e held that, in light of the three requirements spec-
ified in the Constitution, the word 'qualifications' ... was of a precise,
limited nature.""n 7 Thus, the Court agreed with Powell's holding that
the Qualifications Clauses were exclusive.
3. Pure Term Limits Violate Exclusivity
Based on the foregoing, it seems clear that the qualifications re-
quired to be a member of Congress were intended to be exclusively
those enumerated in the Qualifications Clauses. The historical mater-
ials of the Framers" s and the Supreme Court's precedents confirm
that the Qualifications Clauses contain the exclusive requirements for
membership in Congress." 9 As a result, any attempt to create addi-
tional qualifications directly violates this exclusivity. When a state di-
rects that an individual cannot be a member of its congressional
delegation after serving a specified number of terms, the state imposes
additional qualifications which are not among the exclusive qualifica-
tions enumerated in the Constitution. Therefore, state term limits are
unconstitutional.
B. The Definition of "Qualification"
There have been some attempts to define exactly what constitutes
a "qualification" under the Qualifications Clauses of the Constitu-
tion.'20 If a limit on Congressional service does not constitute a "qual-
ification," the exclusivity of the constitutional provisions would not be
violated. Thus, the definition of "qualification" becomes very impor-
tant in determining whether a term limit measure infringes on this
exclusivity.
1. Formal Barrier to Service
One possible standard for judging which measures add to or alter
the constitutional qualifications would be to define a qualification as
any formal barrier for service to Congress.' 2' Under this definition,
117. Id. at 740.
118. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 89-117 and accompanying text.
120. See generally, Sullivan, supra note 11, at 859-71.
121. Sullivan, supra note 11, at 860.
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only regulations which legally prohibit an individual elected to Con-
gress from serving would violate the Constitution. Thus, a ballot ac-
cess term limit would not be unconstitutional if it allows write-in
candidates to serve. 22
Support of this view may be inferred from the Supreme Court's
decision in Storer v. Brown.123 The case involved California regula-
tions which required an independent candidate to fie nomination pa-
pers signed by at least five percent of the voters in the preceding
general election, and those signing must not have voted in any pri-
mary. 24 An independent candidate who sought to have his name
placed on the ballot challenged California's election regulations.1 2
The Court addressed the appellants' claim at length under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. 26 However, the Court summarily dis-
missed a Qualifications Clause challenge.'27 Proponents of state-im-
posed term limits argue that the Storer case demonstrates the
proposition that some qualifications may be added if they are not for-
mal bars to membership in Congress.
The "formal barrier" definition, however, disregards the Framers'
intent that the qualifications were to be exclusively set forth in the
Constitution.'2 In preventing a property qualification from appear-
ing in the text of the Constitution, the Constitutional Convention
surely did not intend to allow states to put a ballot restriction on can-
didates who did not possess a certain amount of property. 29 Clearly,
ballot-access term limits are more onerous to a candidate than a re-
quirement that a candidate obtain a number of voter signatures for
nomination papers. Because "the touchstone of Qualifications
122. See id. at 861.
123. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
124. Id. at 726-27. The regulations also prohibited a candidate from running as an independ-
ent if the candidate voted in the immediately preceding primary election. Id. at 726.
125. See idat 726-28.
126. See iaL at 728-37.
127. See id. at 746 n.16. In this regard the Court stated:
Appellants also contend that [a California regulation] purports to establish an addi-
tional qualification for office of Representative and is invalid under Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, of
the Constitution. The argument is wholly without merit. [Appellants] would not have
been disqualified had they been nominated at a party primary or by an adequately
supported independent petition and then elected at the general election. The non-affil-
iation requirement no more establishes an additional requirement for the office of Rep-
resentative than the requirement that the candidate win the primary to secure a place
on the general ballot or otherwise demonstrate substantial community support.
Id.
128. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
129. See WARREN, supra note 36, at 421.
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Clause[s] jurisprudence has been how an election law affects a candi-
date, not why the candidate is affected,' 13 ° the "formal barrier" defi-
nition is erroneous.
2. Analogies to the Constitutional Qualifications
Another possible standard which could be used to determine
whether a limitation is a "qualification" is whether the regulation con-
tains "unavoidable analogies to the three constitutionally enumerated
qualifications."'13  Under this formulation, any regulation that does
not vary the age, citizenship, and residency requirements of the Quali-
fications Clauses are permissible.
However, this definition belittles the intentions of the Framers
that the qualifications in the Constitution were to be exclusive, not
some minimal requirements. 32 The historical materials discussed ear-
lier show that the use of certain qualifications, such as religious re-
quirements, were the impetus for the exclusivity of the constitutional
qualifications. Therefore, although term limits (pure or ballot-access)
could be constitutional under the unavoidable analogies definition,
they would be contrary to the intent of the Framers which underlies
the Qualifications Clauses would not support the limitations. There-
fore, the unavoidable analogies definition is inconsistent with the
Constitution.
3. Effective Disqualification
A third possible means to determine whether the qualification is
impermissible is whether the regulation constitutes an "effective dis-
qualification" for an individual to serve in Congress. 33 Under this
standard, a law is an unconstitutional qualification if it is "the legal
equivalent of an absolute prohibition from holding office."'134 This
definition, although susceptible to becoming "a judicially unmanage-
able standard,' 3 closely follows the intent of the Framers. First, eva-
sion of the enumerated qualifications would violate the spirit of the
130. Sullivan, supra note 11, at 870.
131. Gorsuch & Guzman, supra note 10, at 363. See also, Sullivan, supra note 11, at 870-71
(discussing the formulation set forth by Gorsuch and Guzman).
132. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
133. See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 866. See also, Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068,
1081 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (stating that state-imposed term limits "would ... have the practical
effect of imposing a new qualification.").
134. Sullivan, supra note 11, at 866-67.
135. Id. at 867.
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Constitution. Surely the Framers did not debate and draft constitu-
tional provisions which could be disregarded. 36 The Supreme Court
has recognized that the Constitution does not contain clauses which
are "empty formalism[s]." 37 Secondly, there is a distinction between
qualifications for membership in Congress and state laws regulating
election procedures by requiring candidates to show community sup-
port.138 An "effective disqualification" does not even allow an indi-
vidual to demonstrate that support. Thus, the "effective
disqualification" standard is the most appropriate means to judge
whether a law constitutes a qualification.
Under the "effective disqualification" standard, Section 3 of
Amendment 73 is an impermissible qualification. Section 3 does not
allow anyone who has served the specified number of terms to appear
on the ballot.139 The possibility of winning as a write-in candidate is
so remote140 that Section 3 becomes "the legal equivalent"'' 4' of a
qualification. Because it is a qualification under this standard, Section
3 is an unconstitutional violation of the exclusive Qualifications
Clauses. 42
V. IMPLICATIONS
The U.S. Term Limits decision creates some interesting questions
on the current state of federal election laws143 and the Supreme
Court's view of federalism. 44 These possible new issues are explored
below.
A. Candidacy as a Constitutional Right
One implication of the U.S. Term Limits decision could be its ef-
fect on the rights of candidates. The extent to which an individual has
a right to be a candidate for public office is a question that has been
136. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1868 (1995).
137. Id. See also, Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926)
("It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution.. . may be manipulated out
of existence.").
138. See U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1870.
139. ARx. CONsT. amend. 73, § 3, held unconstitutional in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
140. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 719 n.5 (1974) (" '[A]ccess' via write-in votes falls far
short of access in terms of having the name of the candidate on the ballot.").
141. Sullivan, supra note 11, at 866.
142. See supra notes 73-119 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 145-75 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 176-223 and accompanying text.
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raised by legal scholars. 45 While the right to be a candidate may ex-
ist, it was not thought to be a fundamental right. 4 6 In Bullock v.
Carter,4 7 the Supreme Court recognized that "the Court has not...
attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous
standard of review."' 8 Therefore, the Court did not subject ballot-
access laws to a strict scrutiny standard of review.149 Furthermore, the
rights were not individually possessed by the candidates because the
right of candidacy is linked to the rights and interests of voters. 50
However, the U.S. Term Limits decision implicitly goes beyond these
notions of a candidate's rights and may be a step toward recognizing
the right as "fundamental."
In the U.S. Term Limits decision, the Court seemed to have given
the right of candidacy to the candidate personally rather than to the
voters. Assuming the amendment imposed a ballot restriction rather
than a qualification, the petitioners argued that Amendment 73 satis-
fied constitutional scrutiny.' 5 ' In response, the Court cited Harman v.
Forssenius52 and said: "As we have often noted, '[c]onstitutional
rights would be of little value if they could be . . . indirectly de-
nied."" 53 Although the Court has usually recognized the right of can-
didacy to be connected to the rights of voters, 54 the Court, by using
the Harman language, seems to have given individuals the personal
constitutional right to be a candidate, as opposed to the right of the
candidate being linked to the rights of voters.
145. See e.g., Nicole A. Gordon, The Constitutional Right to Candidacy, 25 KAN. L. REv. 545
(1977).
146. In Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982) (plurality opinion), Justice Rehnquist noted
that the Court was "[far from recognizing candidacy as a 'fundamental right."' Id. at 963. See
also, Mark E. Dreyer, Comment, Constitutional Problems with Statutes Regulating Ballot Posi-
tion, 23 TULSA L.J. 123, 130 (1987) ("While it may be true that a right to be a candidate exists,
clearly the right is not a fundamental right.").
147. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
148. Id. at 142-43.
149. Under Bullock, the standard of review for Equal Protection challenges of ballot access
laws is "that the laws must be ... found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legiti-
mate state objectives in order to pass constitutional muster." Id. at 144. See also, Clements, 457
U.S. at 968 ("[A]n insignificant interference with access to the ballot need only rest on a rational
predicate in order to [survive].").
150. The Court has stated that "the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend
themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical,
correlative effect on voters." Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143.
151. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1867 (1995).
152. 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
153. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1867 (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540
(1965)).
154. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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The Court went further by using language which alluded to the
fact that the right to be a candidate may now be a fundamental
right. 55 In this instance, the Court was dealing with the petitioner's
argument that the United States Constitution's Elections Clause l 6
permitted states to enact measures like Amendment 73. The Court's
first reaction was to cite Smiley v. Holm157 for the proposition that
"[t]he Elections Clause gives States authority 'to enact... require-
ments... which... are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental
right involved."" 58 The second reaction was a cite to Tashjian v. Re-
publican Party59 for the proposition that "'[t]he power to regulate the
time, place, and manner of elections does not justify... the abridge-
ment of fundamental rights.""' 160 Both of these cases use the phrase
"fundamental right" which implies a different view of the rights of
candidates from that enunciated in Bullock and Clements.
The cumulative effect of Harman, Smiley, and Tashjian, together
with U.S. Term Limits could be that the right of candidacy is now
viewed as a fundamental constitutional right. The effect of recogniz-
ing the right to be a candidate as fundamental would be to subject any
regulation of that right to strict constitutional scrutiny.161 In sum, the
Court's decisions in Bullock and Clements that ballot restrictions are
not subject to strict scrutiny could be subject to attack in future cases.
B. The Hatch Act
A second implication of the U.S. Term Limits decision is that it
may throw the constitutionality of the Hatch Act 162 into question. 163
The Hatch Act prohibits certain federal civil servants' 64 from partici-
pating in certain political activities. 65 Under the Act, some federal
employees are clearly prohibited from running for Congress. 166
155. See U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1869-70.
156. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
157. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
158. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1869 (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355,366 (1932)).
159. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
160. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1870 (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208,
217 (1986)).
161. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
162. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7322-7326 (1994).
163. It has been suggested that the constitutionality of the restrictions in the Hatch Act may
be determinative of the constitutionality of term limits. See, Gorsuch & Guzman, supra note 10,
at 359; Lowenstein, supra note 9, at 27.
164. 5 U.S.C. § 7322(1) (1994).
165. 5 U.S.C. § 7323 (1994).
166. 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(3) (1994).
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The constitutionality of the Hatch Act has been upheld in two
Supreme Court decisions. In United Public Workers v. Mitchell,67 the
Court upheld the Hatch Act against a First Amendment challenge. 168
Balancing the liberties of the government employee against the gov-
ernmental interests, the Court found that "Congress may regulate the
political conduct of Government employees 'within reasonable limits,'
even though the regulation trenches to some extent upon unfettered
political action."'1 69 In United States Civil Service Commission v. Na-
tional Association of Letters Carriers,170 the Court "unhesitatingly" re-
affirmed the Mitchell decision. 7' The Letter Carriers Court also
rejected challenges to the Hatch Act based on vagueness and the
overbreadth doctrine.172 In fact, the Court determined that nothing in
the Constitution could invalidate those regulations. 73
The question now becomes whether the U.S. Term Limits deci-
sion makes the Hatch Act unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits an
individual from serving in Congress who meets the age, citizenship,
and residency requirements of the Constitution.1 74 Clearly, the Hatch
Act is not a strict prohibition against serving in Congress since the
employee could serve by resigning the position. However, the Hatch
Act's restriction 175 could constitute an effective disqualification since
it forces such a resignation. If the Hatch Act were to be challenged on
these grounds, it is unclear how the Supreme Court would rule. Nev-
ertheless, the U.S. Term Limits decision provides greater support for a
challenge than has previously been available.
C. Whose Federalism?
While the most important aspect of the US. Term Limits decision
is its holding that state-imposition of term limits on members of Con-
gress is unconstitutional, it is not the only substantive aspect of the
167. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
168. The court recognized that a First Amendment challenge was at least cognizable. Id at
94-95 ("[W]e have a measure of interference by the Hatch Act... with what otherwise would be
the freedom of the civil servant under the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments.").
169. Id. at 102.
170. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
171. Id. at 556.
172. Id. at 568.
173. See id. at 556 ("[N]either the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitu-
tion invalidates [the Hatch Act].").
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
175. 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
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majority and dissenting opinions. Clearly, the majority could have fo-
cused solely on the exclusivity of the Qualifications Clauses. 176 Be-
cause of this exclusivity, in light of the historical materials of the
Framers and the previous Supreme Court opinions of Powell v. Mc-
Cormack177 and Nixon v. United States,178 Section 3 of Amendment 73
is unconstitutional. However, in the broad scheme of constitutional
law, the U.S. Term Limits decision was an important announcement
by the majority and dissenting factions of the Court on their respec-
tive views of federalism. Particularly, the two factions expressed dif-
ferent opinions as to the extent of a reserved power under the Tenth
Amendment when a state did not possess the power prior to the ratifi-
cation of the Constitution.
1. The Majority's View
Although the U.S. Term Limits decision reiterated Powell's hold-
ing that the Qualifications Clauses 179 were exclusive, the Court went
beyond the issue of exclusivity. The Court went further by addressing
the Petitioners' claim that the Tenth Amendment 80 permits States to
exercise their reserved powers by adding qualifications to serve as
members of their congressional delegations."8 The Court determined
that the power to establish term limits was absent since a State cannot
reserve that which it did not have prior to the ratification of theConstitution.18
The Federalist Papers clearly support the majority's position that
States can only reserve a power under the Tenth Amendment if they
possessed the power prior to the Constitution's ratification. Alexan-
der Hamilton's writing on the powers of States under the Constitution
espoused the view that the powers reserved to the States under consti-
tutional federalism must be possessed prior to ratification. 8 3 He spe-
cifically wrote that "as the plan of the convention aims only at a
partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly
176. See supra notes 70-142 and accompanying text.
177. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
178. 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 3, cl. 3.
180. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
181. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1852 (1995) ("[P]etitioners argue
[that] the Tenth Amendment and the principle of reserved powers require that States be allowed
to add such qualifications.").
182. Id. at 1854 ("[T]he power to add qualifications is not within the 'original powers' of the
States, and thus is not reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.").
183. Tim FEDERAUSr No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton).
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retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before [possessed]."'184
Hamilton qualified the retained rights of the states by his use of
"before." Thus, the Framers of the Constitution recognized the prin-
ciple stated by the majority in U.S. Term Limits. 85
The reasoning of McCulloch v. Maryland86 also clearly supports
the principle that a state cannot reserve what it did not have prior to
ratifying the Constitution. In McCulloch, the Court found that a
power not mentioned in the Constitution was not reserved to the
States. 8 7 Chief Justice Marshall explained that when a State power
never existed, "the question of whether it has been surrendered can-
not arise. ''""s Further, Chief Justice Marshall recognized that States
cannot be deprived of powers "which they originally possessed."'18 9
McCulloch therefore recognizes the absence of reserved power by the
States on issues unknown to them prior to ratification unless the Con-
stitution specifically delegates that power to the States.
The reasoning of Sturges v. Crowninshield'90 also suggests that
State powers must have existed prior to ratification of the Constitu-
tion' 91 for the powers to be "reserved." The initial issue in the Sturges
case regarded the power of States to enact bankruptcy laws.192 The
Court determined that States, in fact, did have the power to enact
bankruptcy laws prior to the ratification of the Constitution. 93 Thus,
the issue in the case became whether, under the Constitution, the
power to establish bankruptcy laws was exclusive to the federal gov-
ernment.194 In deciding the case, the Court seemed to emphasize that
it would not have addressed the exclusivity issue if it had found that
the States never had the power to enact bankruptcy laws. 95 The
184. THe FEDERALIST No. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
185. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1854 (1995) ("[The Tenth] Amend-
ment could only 'reserve' that which existed before.").
186. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
187. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1854 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819)).
188. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 430. The U.S. Term Limits majority, like Chief Justice
Marshall in McCulloch, recognized the jurisprudential principle "that certain powers are not
reserved to the States despite constitutional silence." U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1854 n.15.
189. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436.
190. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
191. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
192. Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 192.
193. Id. at 192-93.
194. Id. at 193.
195. The Sturges Court found:
When the American people created a national legislature, with certain enumerated
powers, it was neither necessary nor proper to define the powers retained by the States.
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Sturges case, therefore, implicitly recognizes the principle that states
do not reserve powers under the Tenth Amendment 96 which they did
not have prior to ratification of the Constitution.
Justice Joseph Story also recognized this principle in his writings
on the Constitution.197 Justice Story, in addressing the argument that
States could add qualifications to those elected to Congress under the
Tenth Amendment, wrote that States cannot reserve powers unless
the powers existed before the Constitution was adopted. 198 This prin-
ciple was very clearly stated by Justice Story: "The truth is, that the
states can exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out
of the existence of the national government, which the constitution
does not delegate to them."'99 Thus, Justice Story's conclusion seems
to lend persuasive support for this Tenth Amendment principle.
Although the U.S. Term Limits Court did not refer to it, Carter v.
Carter Coal Co.200 also supports its position. Carter, which focused
on federal taxation of coal mining, addressed the respective powers of
the national government and the governments of the several States.20 1
In implicitly adopting the principle stated in U.S. Term Limits, the
Court noted that "[t]he states were before the Constitution; and, con-
sequently, their legislative powers antedated the Constitution."20 2
However, the Court noted that the power of the States after ratifica-
tion of the Constitution extended only to those powers "then pos-
sessed by the [S]tates. 20 3
The Carter decision was found controlling by the Court in an-
other case not cited by the U.S. Term Limits majority, United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.2° Although the case involved a decision
on the international powers of the federal government and the divi-
sion of those powers between the Congress and the President,20 5 its
These powers proceed, not from the people of America, but from the people of the
several States; and remain, after the adoption of the constitution, what they were
before, except so far as they may be abridged by that instrument.
Id. (emphasis added).
196. U.S. CONsr. amend. X.
197. 2 STORY, supra note 85, at § 625-26.
198. ld. at § 625.
199. Id. at § 626.
200. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
201. Id. at 294.
202. Id
203. Id
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reasoning is very similar to the majority's reasoning in U.S. Term Lim-
its to the extent of States' powers. In Curtiss-Wright, the Court, in
making a distinction between the foreign and domestic powers of the
Congress, found that the several States did not possess international
powers prior to ratification of the Constitution; instead power was
vested in the Union of the Colonies.2 6 In doing so, the Court empha-
sized the Carter language that the retained powers were those "then
possessed by the states. °20 7
In light of the authorities cited by the U.S. Term Limits majority
and the Carter and Curtiss-Wright cases, in addition to the intent of
the Framers, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the Tenth
Amendment only reserved to the States those powers which they pos-
sessed prior to ratification of the Constitution.
2. The Dissent's View
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Scalia, took the position that States can exercise any
power that is not withheld from them by the text of the Constitu-
tion.208 Silence by the Constitution, in the dissenters' view, does not
take a particular power away from the States.20 9 This position, how-
ever, is refuted by the authorities which support the majority's
position.
The first argument presented by Justice Thomas was directed to-
ward the meaning of the word "reserved" in the Tenth Amend-
ment.210 He understood the term to imply nothing about whether a
state possessed a power prior to ratification of the Constitution. 1 '
Thus, he disagreed with the majority's conclusion that state govern-
ments cannot "exercise... powers that were unknown to the States
when the Federal Constitution was drafted. '2 12
Justice Thomas also took issue with the majority's citation of the
Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority.2 13 That case involved the extent to which the power of Con-
gress was limited by constitutional federalism, not the power of
206. Id. at 315-16.
207. Id at 316 (emphasis in original) (citing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294
(1936)).
208. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842,1876 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
209. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
210. See id. at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
211. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
213. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
19961
23
Hans: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton: State-Imposed Term Limits Are
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1995
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
States.214 Thus, the Garcia decision is not on point as it does not pro-
vide any guidance on the issue of the extent of the States "reserved"
powers.
Justice Thomas failed to support his position on these points. He
did nothing to refute the majority's reliance on the Framers intent
shown in the Federalist Papers.215 Furthermore, the Carter and Cur-
tiss-Wright cases, though not cited in the majority opinion, provide
clear support for the majority's position.2 16 Thus, the dissenting opin-
ion authored by Justice Thomas failed to fully address the issue con-
cerning the reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment.
3. The Future
The U.S. Term Limits decision has already been recognized as an
important case on the nature of federalism by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. In Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson,2 17 the court ad-
dressed an appeal of a permanent injunction requiring the state of
California to comply with the National Voter Registration Act of
1993.218 The court recognized that, while the Act only directly applied
to federal elections, it would have a significant impact on how state
and local elections are conducted. 1 The court upheld the permanent
injunction but cautioned the district court that, in implementing the
injunction, care should be taken to see that the law had no effect on
how California sought to conduct its elections.22 ° This was based on
Justice Kennedy's admonition in U.S. Term Limits to recognize state
sovereignty in state elections.22
Despite this recent reference to the case, the principle discussed
in U.S. Tenn Limits seems to have limited applicability since it only
applies to powers not possessed by the States prior to the Constitu-
tion's ratification. There are, perhaps, only two powers that the states
did not have prior to ratification of the Constitution: they did not
have any international powers,2  and they did not have powers for
214. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
215. See id. at 1875-1914 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
216. See supra notes 200-07 and accompanying text.
217. 60 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995).
218. Id. at 1412-13.
219. ld. at 1415.
220. ld. at 1416.
221. Id. at 1415 (citing U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1841, 1872 (1995) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
222. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936).
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the election of federal officers.223 Therefore, the principle in this case,
while important in a theoretical sense, may prove to have only limited
applicability. The future impact of U.S. Term Limits on the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence is uncertain.
VI. CONCLUSION
Clearly, there are merits to having term limits on members of
Congress. Term limits could open doors for minorities and women
who may otherwise be excluded by career incumbents. Term limits
may also reduce what some perceive as abuse of the office by Mem-
bers of Congress.
However, as this note has shown, state-imposed pure term limits
violate the Qualifications Clauses of the Constitution. Additionally,
state-imposed ballot access term limits are unconstitutional in the
same manner since they constitute qualifications. Since any form of
state-imposed term limits are not permitted under the Constitution,
states should work toward effectuating term limits through an amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution.
Before the decision U.S. Term Limits was handed down, one
scholar noted that "this is about as easy a case as the Supreme Court
gets."'" 4 The analysis contained in this note demonstrates the accu-
racy of that statement. Despite this clarity, the Court went far beyond
what it had to do to decide the issue in the case. And while the nar-
row reading of U.S. Term Limits is that state-imposed term limits are
unconstitutional, the broad reading may be yet to come.
Jason M. Hans
223. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. CL 1842 (1995).
224. Coyle, supra note 13.
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